Intervenor State of California's Reply Brief in Support of Intervenor's Motion for Summary Judgment

(09-cv-0897-BEN-JMA)

### I. THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT IS CONSTITUTIONAL. [COUNT 1]

Plaintiffs' challenge to the disclosure requirement suffers from a fatal shortcoming: Plaintiffs present no evidence that the requirement places a burden on the First Amendment rights of those who use the initiative process. Plaintiffs are unable to identify any proposed initiative anywhere in California that failed for want of a proponent. The reality is that California has the most active local-initiative system in the country. The sum of plaintiffs' evidence is that one Californian – plaintiff Larry Breitfelder – now says that he will never again act as an initiative proponent if his name must appear on the initiative petition. (Plaintiffs' Opp. at p. 20, l. 26.) This is not enough; it is not even close. *Cf. Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.*, 525 U.S. 182, 197-198 (1999) ("Evidence presented to the District Court, that court found, 'demonstrated that compelling circulators to wear identification badges inhibits participation in the petitioning process."")

The bulk of plaintiffs' opposition argues that the disclosure provision is subject to strict scrutiny. (See Plaintiffs' Opp. at pp. 13-20.) This is wrong. An initiative petition is a non-public forum subject to reasonable government regulation. (*See* Intervenor's Opp. to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at pp. 8-11.) Even if an initiative petition were subject to general First Amendment law applicable to compulsory disclosure statutes in the electoral context, it would be subject to the exacting scrutiny test recently announced in *Doe v. Reed*, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010). The challenged disclosure provision, which applies only to initiative petitions, and to a maximum of three people, passes either test.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Tracy M. Gordon, The Local Initiative in California (Public Policy Institute of California, 2004), p. v. (available at http://www.ppic.org/main/policyarea.asp?i=5&view=all); California Secretary of State, Report on Municipal Initiative Measures During 2009-2010 (EC § 9213) [Waters Decl., Exh. 4].

# II. THE REQUIREMENT THAT INITIATIVE PROPONENTS BE ELECTORS IS CONSTITUTIONAL. [COUNT 2]

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The submission of an initiative petition is the first step in a legislative process:

The initiative petition with its notice of intention is not a handbill or campaign flyer — it is an official election document subject to various restrictions by the Elections Code, including reasonable content requirements of truth. It is the constitutionally and legislatively sanctioned method by which an election is obtained on a given initiative proposal.

San Francisco Forty-Niners v. Nishioka, 75 Cal. App. 4th 637, 648 (Cal. App. 1999) (emphasis added). Because an initiative petition is a legislative document, it is legitimately limited to members of the legislative body, in this case the electorate. The distinction between electors and non-electors is manifested in a wide range of elections statutes. Only electors are allowed to vote. Cal. Const., art. II, § 2. Only electors are allowed to run for public office. Cal. Const., art. V, § 2 [Governor]; art. IV, § 2(c) [Legislature]. Only electors are allowed to sign initiative petitions. Cal. Const., art. II, § 8(b). Only electors are allowed to sign nominating papers necessary to qualify candidates for the ballot. § 8060. And only electors (elected legislators) are allowed to introduce bills to the Legislature. (Waters Decl. in Opp. to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. 5.)

Plaintiffs' challenge rests almost entirely on a recent Supreme Court decision which invalidated a federal law that prohibited all corporate independent expenditures in connection with federal elections. *Citizens United v. Federal Election Com'n*, 130 S.Ct. 876, 913, 917 (2010). Specifically, plaintiffs rely on the Court's statement that "Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity." *Id.*, 130 S.Ct. at 913. But *Citizens United* did not purport to grant to corporations a right to perform primarily legislative acts such as proposing an initiative. (See Intervenor's Opp. to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at pp. 18-19.) The Ninth Circuit has declined to extend *Citizens United* to corporate speech other than independent expenditures. *Thalheimer v. City of San Diego*, 2011 WL 2400779, \*14 (9th Cir. 2011).

In the present case, California has drawn a functional line between electors (who can propose and vote on initiative proposals) and non-individuals (who cannot). The First Amendment does not prohibit that distinction. *See Thalheimer*, 2011 WL 2400779, \*14.

## III. THE CHALLENGED STATUTES ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. [COUNTS 3-5]

A statute's vagueness exceeds constitutional limits if its "deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both real and substantial, and if the statute is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts." *California. Teachers Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ.*, 271 F.3d 1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citation and ellipsis omitted). For several reasons, plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish that the challenged statutes chill any substantial amount of protected speech.

First, California has the most active local initiative system in the country.

Second, the typical vagueness challenge is to a statute that imposes criminal or civil sanctions. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1976) (criminal sanctions for violations of Federal Election Campaign Act); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 106 (1972) (civil fine for violation of noise ordinance); Human Life of Washington Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1020 (9th Cir. 2010) (civil penalties and criminal sanctions for violation of state campaign finance disclosure law). Here the challenged statutes impose neither criminal nor civil sanctions. The only negative consequence of not complying with the challenged statutes is disqualification of an initiative proposal. But the proposal can always be re-submitted, which is what happened here.

Third, recognizing that there is some ambiguity in all statutes, California courts have developed a doctrine of "substantial compliance" to protect the rights of those who propose initiatives:

[T]echnical deficiencies in referendum and initiative petitions will not invalidate the petitions if they are in "substantial compliance" with statutory and constitutional requirements. A paramount concern in determining whether a petition is valid despite an alleged defect is whether the purpose of the technical requirement is frustrated by the defective form of the petition.

Assembly of State of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal.3d 638, 652 (1982). The doctrine of 1 substantial compliance has been invoked on several occasions to forgive minor mistakes 2 in petitions. See California Teachers Assn. v. Collins, 1 Cal.2d 202, 204 (Cal. 1934) 3 (court orders registrar of voters to file initiative petition whose title was set out in 12-point, 4 as opposed to 18-point, type); Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, 646, 651 (referendum 5 petitions asking for signers' "address as registered to vote," as opposed to "residence 6 address" required by Elections Code, accepted for filing in light of long-standing practice 7 of county registrars to accept such petitions); Zaremberg v. Superior Court, 115 8 Cal.App.4th 111, 119 (Cal.App. 2004) (omission of short title on each page of referendum 9 petition does not disqualify petitions where each page contained statement "Referendum 10 Against an Act Passed by the Legislature"). 11 The bottom line is that ambiguities in statutes will not bar initiative proposals so 12

The bottom line is that ambiguities in statutes will not bar initiative proposals so long as the clearly legitimate scope of a statute is complied with. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs in the present case, they could not take advantage of this doctrine because California law is clear that petitions that omit the names of the initiative's proponents must be rejected. See 83 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 139, 142 (2000) ("the city clerk is required to reject a petition that does not contain a notice of intent with the name or names of the proponents of the initiative"; Myers v. Patterson, 196 Cal.App.3d 130, 138-39 (1987). But this is not an indictment of the California local initiative system, which remains wideopen, robust, and open to all electors.

The record is clear that the challenged statutes do not impose a substantial chill on protected speech. Any remaining ambiguities in the statutes can be resolved by California courts using well-established rules of statutory interpretation. As a result, plaintiffs' vagueness challenge fails.

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### **CONCLUSION** For the reasons set forth above, Intervernor State of California's motion for summary judgment should be granted. Respectfully Submitted, Dated: August 1, 2011 KAMALA D. HARRIS Attorney General of California PETER A. KRAUSE Supervising Deputy Attorney General /s/ George Waters GEORGE WATERS Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Intervenor State of California SA2009311244 10733119.doc Intervenor State of California's Reply Brief in Support of Intervenor's Motion for Summary Judgment

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#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case Name:

Chula Vista Citizens, et al. v.

No.

09-cv-0897-BEN-JMA

Donna Norris, et al.

I hereby certify that on <u>August 1, 2011</u>, I electronically filed the following documents with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system:

## INTERVENOR STATE OF CALIFORNIA'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF INTERVENOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I certify that **all** participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on <u>August 1, 2011</u>, at Sacramento, California.

George Waters Brenda Apodaca /s/ George Waters /s/ Brenda Apodaca

Declarant

Signature

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